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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
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Attorneys for Appellant

JOHN K. RICE (4397)
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT ELDER
WAS TOTALLY RELEASED FROM ANY PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY.
The trial court erred in not finding and concluding that Elder was totally released from

any partnership liability. Because Elder was totally released from any obligations, the trial court
erred.
Elder argued throughout the proceedings below that a new agreement supplanted any
prior agreement. The evidence supported the existence of a new agreement. Tr. At 1358, pp. 45;
92-99 & Tr. At 1359, pp. 248-250.

Specifically, after Elder notified Rutherford that he wanted

to dissolve the partnership, Rutherford communicated that intent to Birschbach. Tr. At 1358, pp.
45; 92-93. Rutherford and Birschbach held a meeting at a football field. At that meeting,
Birschbach and Rutherford agreed to continue with the business relationship without Elder's
involvement. Birschbach agreed that Rutherford would assume the liabilities of the
Elder/Rutherford partnership. In essence, Birschbach agreed that he would not look to Elder for
payment. This agreement was communicated by Birschbach's new partner, Rutherford, to Elder.
Tr. at 1358, pp. 45; 92-99 & Tr. at 1359, 248-250.
Clearly, Elder properly preserved the issue of release to the trial court. Birschbach's
argument that he did not preserve the matter for appeal is disingenuous. In Mills v. Brody, 929
P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Court, in discussing the preservation of an issue on
appeal, stated
Finally, Brody failed to preserve her claim that the Millses should be estopped from
refusing to sell their condominium. Although Brody mentioned estoppel in her answer
and made some references to the issue in a hearing before the trial court, these nominal
references did not sufficiently raise the issue to a "level of consciousness" before the trial
court. James v. Preston J 46 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah App. 1987). Because Brody failed to
5

provide the trial court with any legal authority, the trial court could not properly rule on
the issue. SeeLeBaron & Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah
App. 1991) (stating that "mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in support of the claim, is . . .
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal").
In the instant case, Elder clearly raised the issue to the "level of consciousness" before the trial
court. As previously noted, not only did Elder raise release as an affirmative defense in his
answer, but he also presented substantial evidence before the trial court on that very issue. The
issue of release was properly preserved for appeal.
Section 48-1-33, Utah Code Annotated clearly applies to the issues which were before
the trial court. It is axiomatic that it is the responsibility of a trial court to apply the laws of this
jurisdiction to the matters which are before it. Section 48-1-33(2) and (3) are directly on point
with the facts and circumstances of this case:
48-1-33. Effect of dissolution on partner's existing liability*
(1)...;
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon dissolution of the partnership
by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership creditor and the person or
partnership continuing the business; and such agreement may be inferred from the course
of dealing between the creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or
partnership continuing the business.
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partnership,
the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability
to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agreement, consents to a material
alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obligations.
Applying the foregoing statute, subsection (2) to the facts of this case. Elder and
Rutherford were partners. Elder and Rutherford agreed to discontinue the partnership. At that
time, Rutherford went to Birschbach, the creditor, and informed him of Elder's decision. At the
football field, Birschbach and Rutherford entered an agreement to continue the business. This
agreement can and should have been inferred by the course of dealings between Birschbach and

6

Rutherford. This agreement discharged Elder's liability in whole to Birschbach.
Further, when Rutherford agreed to assume the existing liabilities of the partnership,
Birschbach consented to that assumption. By so doing, he discharged Elder from any liability
under Section 48-1-33(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). To the extent that the
Court did not conclude as a matter of law that Elder was released when it concluded that a new
agreement was entered into between Rutherford and Birschbach, this was an error in law.
Contrary to Birschbach's argument, it was unnecessary for the Court to find that there
was an agreement to release Elder from any liability prior to August 31, 1998. Rather, by
operation of law, upon entering into a new agreement with Rutherford, Birschbach discharged
Elder of liability for any past partnership obligations which Elder may have owed to Birschbach.

IL

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ELDER BREACHED THE
CONTRACT.
The trial court erred in concluding that Elder breached a contract with Birschbach.

Birschbach contends that Elder has the duty to marshal the evidence in support of this finding.
The existence of a contract is a conclusion of law. See Wadsworth Const v. City of St. George,
865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), aff d, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995). There is no dispute
that an oral agreement existed between Elder as part of a partnership and Birschbach. Further, it
is also undisputed that at the time of Elder's decision to exit and dissolve the partnership, part of
the terms of that agreement, i.e. the payment of expenses, had not been fulfilled. However, when
Rutherford and Birschbach entered their new agreement, this operated as a matter of law of
discharging Elder's obligations under the contractual agreement between himself as a partner in
the Elder/Rutherford partnership. Because of this new agreement, as a matter of law, Elder was
not in breach of any prior agreement. The trial court erred in concluding that a breach which
7

was actionable after the entry of the new agreement occurred.
HI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DAMAGES WERE
CAPABLE OF DETERMINATION.
The trial court erred in concluding that damages were capable of determination.

Damages must be shown with reasonable certainty. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT 201,
71 P.3d 188. In the instant action, they were not. Admittedly, damages need not be proven with
precision, however the evidence in this matter shows that the closest one gets to precision is
surgery with a butcher knife.
Birschbach called an accountant who had permitted his CPA certification to lapse who
estimated damages at approximately $220,000.00 although he admitted that there was inadequate
information to determine the amount with certainty. Tr. at V. 1358, pp 140-153, 161-65; Tr. at
V. 1359, p. 324. Elder's expert testified that the deficiency could be around $35,105.61, but that
the financial records were in such disarray that there was no way to do an analysis with any
certainty. Tr. at V. 1359, pp. 297-298.
An award of damages based upon speculation cannot be upheld. Cook Associates, Inc. v.
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983). The evidence must not be so indefinite as to allow
the fact finder to speculate freely as to the amount of damages. Penelko, Inc. v. John Price
Associates, Inc., 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982).
Clearly, there is a substantial distinction between the lack of need for precision and the
inability to testify as to damages with any degree of certainty. If the experts called to testify
could not establish the damages with precision, to prevail Birschbach had to establish his
damages with at least some degree of certainty. Because the experts called to testify both stated
that their opinions lacked that certainty, the finder of fact was left to nothing but speculation.
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This was error.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING ELDER'S MOTION TO DISMISS
AT THE CONCLUSION OF CREDITOR BIRSCHBACH'S CASE IN CHIEF.
The trial court erred in denying Elder's Motion to Dismiss as the conclusion of

Birschbach's case in chief. Elder moved to dismiss the action at the conclusion of Birschbach's
case for his failure to make out a prima facie case as to all of the elements of his claim, relying
the failure to establish the damage element. The Court denied that Motion to Dismiss.
As argued above, Birschbach failed to establish his damages with sufficient certainty to
be legally cognizable. The Court denied that Motion, Elder believes in error. On a Motion to
Dismiss, the trial court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party. When doing so, the Court must then determine whether the non-moving party has made a
prima facie showing of each of the elements of his claim. Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, 990
P.2d933.
As noted above, Elder's expert testified that he could not establish damages with any
degree of certainty. This is clearly a fairly to establish one of the elements upon which
Birschbach had the burden of proof. As such, the trial court erred in denying Elder's Motion to
Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the trial court erred in not finding and concluding that Elder was totally
released from any partnership liability based on the subsequent agreements between Rutherford
and Birschbach. The trial court erred in concluding that Elder breached the contract with
Birschbach. The trial court erred in concluding that the damages were capable of determination
with any reasonable degree of certainty. Finally, the trial court erred in not granting Elder's
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Motion to Dismiss at the conclusion of Birschbach's case where Birschbach failed to establish
each element of his causes of action by a preponderance of the evidence. This Court should
reverse the trial court's conclusion that there was only a partial release and reverse the judgment
entered against Elder in the amount of $22,500.00. This Court should remand the caese to the
trial court with instruction directing the trial court to enter an order dismissing Birschbach's
complaint, and all causes of action contained therein, with prejudice.
Dated and Signed this j[_ day of November, 2003.

JohifX- Rice
Aftafney for Appellee, Deloy Elder
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mailed, postage prepaid and first class, on this the f day of November, 2003, to the following:
Steven G. Loosle
Kruse, Landa, Maycock, & Ricks, LLC
50 West Broadway, Suite 800 (84101)
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